This ethresear.ch essay argues that crypto has already relieved its execution, proof, and interoperability bottlenecks, leaving positive-sum coordination—incentive design—as the last binding constraint, and that this constraint is demand-side (non-adoption of existing neutral mechanisms) rather than supply-side. The author presents a commit-reveal uniform-price batch auction that structurally eliminates intra-batch ordering rent (sandwich attacks), while conceding that similar mechanisms already ship in CoW Protocol and were proposed academically by Budish, yet remain non-default because liquidity and attention flow toward extractive AMMs like Uniswap. The essay narrows its claim against counterexamples—noting stablecoins USDT and USDC succeed on a non-distinctive axis and that Tornado Cash's privacy bottleneck was regulatory—and offers a falsifiable prediction that working positive-sum mechanisms will gain ground only in merit-priced channels.
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